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Abstract
This paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politiciansoutside earnings. We
propose a simple theoretical model with politicians facing a tradeo¤ between allocating their
time to political e¤ort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings. The model has
a testable implication stating that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively
related to the degree of electoral competition. We test this implication using a new dataset on
outside earnings of members of the German federal assembly. Taking into account the potential
endogeneity of measures of political competition that depend on past election outcomes, we nd
that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings.
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1 Introduction
The conict of interests between voters as principals and elected politicians as agents is an old
theme. While voters are concerned with electing competent representatives, they cannot dir-
ectly observe e¤ort and ability. In general, this lack of monitoring and the resulting asymmetric
information allows elected politicians to extract rents. These rents may take various forms, such
as pork-barrel projects, corruption, or slack to cultivate private a¤airs. The most important
mechanism that helps voters to keep elected o¢ cials accountable for their actions is electoral
competition. While there is a sizable theoretical literature on the e¤ects of di¤erent electoral
rules on the level of rent extraction1 and a number of empirical studies using macro data2,
there are few empirical studies that provide micro-evidence on the relation between forms and
intensity of electoral competition and the behavior of politicians.
One potentially important dimension of diverging interests between elected representatives and
voters is the opportunity of politicians to engage in private sector activities to earn outside
income. Interestingly, in most democracies elected politicians such as members of parliament
can legally work in the private sector. It has been noted that the opportunity of elected
o¢ cials to keep private sector jobs and corresponding income may well have positive e¤ects
on the overall quality of policymaking. For instance, if high-ability citizens can keep outside
earnings while appointed in parliament, they will be more likely to run for public o¢ ce. Hence,
outside earnings may increase the average quality of politicians (Gagliarducci et al., 2007a). In
contrast, for given ability, if politicians devote part of their time to private sector work, this
will reduce the quality of policymaking.3
This paper uses micro-data to investigate the role of electoral competition for the tradeo¤
between political activities and work that generates outside earnings. The general idea behind
this is straightforward: While voters usually cannot observe the amount of time devoted to
outside work, they can punish politicians for neglecting their responsibilities and pursuing their
private business by voting them out of o¢ ce. Consequently, when deciding on the optimal level
of private sector activities, elected politicians will weigh the gains from outside work against
the increased risk of not getting reelected. If electoral competition is low, the probability
of reelection is high, and the marginal benet from political activity is low. In contrast, if
1See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000) and Myerson (1993).
2Examples are Persson and Tabellini (2003), Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) as well as Milesi-Ferretti,
Perotti and Rostagno (2002).
3We do not discuss the case where politicians are inuenced by or even get nancially dependent on special
interest groups. For related evidence, see Couch, Atkinson and Shughart (1992), analyzing how politicians who
are on the payroll of higher education institutions a¤ect public funding per college student.
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competition is erce and electoral races are close, the marginal benet of political work tends
to be high. Consequently, electoral competition a¤ects the tradeo¤ between political activity
and work in the private sector. If competition gets stronger, politicians re-allocate time from
outside work towards political activity, and outside earnings decrease. In this perspective,
electoral competition limits political rents.
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. Firstly, we set up a simple theoretical framework
that allows us to address the tradeo¤ between outside earnings and reelection prospects. The
model predicts that politicians facing strong political competition should devote less time to
outside work. In the second part of the paper, we take this prediction to real data. Using
a unique dataset covering all members of the German Bundestag and providing detailed in-
formation on outside earnings for the years 2005-07, we test whether the degree of electoral
competition has any e¤ect on outside earnings. Our identication strategy accounts for the
fact that measures of electoral competition are likely to be endogenous in an empirical model of
outside earnings. Exploiting the fact that in German federal elections, voters cast one vote to
elect a candidate representing the electoral district and a second vote to determine the strength
of parties in the Bundestag, we construct instrumental variables for the degree of electoral
competition at the district level. Our results point to a signicant impact of electoral competi-
tion on outside earnings. An increase in the vote margin in the next preceding election by one
standard deviation is estimated to increase outside earnings over a four-year term by 18,000 to
19,200 Euros on average.
The paper is related to a number of important contributions dealing with the selection of
citizens into political careers and the decision of elected o¢ cials how to allocate time to di¤erent
activities. The latter decision is addressed by Besley (2004) who builds a principal-agent model
in which the e¤ect of higher wages on politiciansactivities can be analyzed. Gagliarducci et
al. (2007b) show that Italian politicians who are elected by majority rule show higher e¤ort
levels (lower absenteeism) than politicians who are elected in a proportional system. The voting
behavior of members of the U.S. Senate is analyzed in Rosenson (2007). Among other things, the
author nds that electorally vulnerable members were less likely to support legislation limiting
honoraria income. Parker (1992) o¤ers a general discussion of the determinants of honoraria
income among members of the U.S. Congress, nding no e¤ect of electoral competition. In
Gagliarducci et al. (2007a), the authors point to a positive relation between outside income and
absenteeism and discuss the role of outside earnings in the process of self-selection of citizens
into political careers. The latter issue is also analyzed by Fiorina (1994) who explains the
phenomenon of divided government in the US, arguing that professional careers as politicians
are more attractive to Democrats than to Republicans. He nds that higher compensation
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increases the number of Democrats in legislation. Part of the analysis in Besley (2004) is
concerned with the decision of high-ability-citizens to candidate for o¢ ce, see also Besley (2005)
as well as Poutvaara and Takalo (2007). Further contributions in this eld are Messner and
Polborn (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004), as well as Mattozzi and Merlo (2007a, 2007b).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we propose a simple
theoretical model with politicians facing a tradeo¤ between allocating their time to political
e¤ort and an alternative use generating outside earnings. Section 3 describes the institutional
background, the empirical model and the data including some descriptive statistics. The results
of our empirical analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a representative two-period-lived politician who receives utility from consumption
and from being in o¢ ce. In both periods, she is endowed with one unit of time. In the rst
period, she decides how to allocate time to political e¤ort t1 and private sector work 1   t1.
Whereas t1 increases the probability of being (re)elected to hold o¢ ce in period 2, 1   t1
increases earnings. Let w denote the outside occupations wage rate of the incumbent and !
the (regular) occupations wage rate of the challenger. The compensation payed to politicians
for holding o¢ ce is W . This compensation is xed, i.e. it does not depend on the amount of
time allocated to political e¤ort. For the sake of completeness, let 
 be an equivalent lump-sum
income of the challenger.
Let C1 and C2 denote consumption in period 1 and 2, respectively. The rst period budget
constraint is then given by C1 = W + w (1  t1) if the politician is in o¢ ce, and C1 = 
 +
! (1  t1) otherwise. In contrast, the second period budget constraint depends on the outcome
of the election which is assumed to take place between period 1 and 2. If the politician is
(re)elected, the level of second period consumption is given by C2 = W + w and C2 = 
 + !
otherwise. Here, we used t2 = 0 which reects that politicians have no incentive to allocate
time to political e¤ort in the second period.
In the following, we will di¤erentiate between two types of politicians, i = A;B, the incumbent
A who holds o¢ ce in period 1 and the challenger B. Each politician i maximizes her expected
utility as given by
max
ti1
E
 
U i

= iU
 
Ci1;W + w
i; i

+
 
1  iU  Ci1;
i + !i; 0 (1)
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where i = i (ti1) is the probability of reelection which is a function of rst-period political
e¤ort ti1. The preference parameter 
i measures the non-pecuniary value of being in o¢ ce. U is
assumed to be increasing, strictly concave and separable in both C1, C2 and . For simplicity,
we assume that the cross-derivatives are zero.
The optimal choice of ti1 is given by
@E (U i)
@ti1
=
@Ci1
@ti1
UCi1 + 
i0  U i;e   U i;ne = 0 (2)
where @C
i
1
@ti1
=  wi in case of the incumbent and @Ci1
@ti1
=  !i in case of the challenger. U i;e =
U (Ci1;W + w
i; i) denotes the utility when being elected and U i;ne the utility when not being
elected. Thus, the optimal choice equalizes the marginal benets from political e¤ort and
outside work in period 1. The marginal benet from outside work is simply the marginal utility
from period-1 consumption times the wage under consideration, w or !, respectively, see the
rst term on the right hand side. The marginal benet from political e¤ort is given by its
marginal e¤ect on the reelection probability i0 times the utility di¤erence. Note that, given
i0 > 0, a positive amount of time spent for political work, ti1 > 0, requires U
i;e   U i;ne > 0,
i.e. the politician has to assign a higher utility to being in o¢ ce than to losing the election and
working in her former profession. This is satised for su¢ ciently high levels of i.
How does political competition look like? The incumbent and the challenger compete for a
constituency. In the following, we will consider the case, in which both politicians have identical
preferences and wage rates are equal: wA = !B and W = 
B. The appendix discusses some
implications of relaxing this assumption. In order to determine the election probability  (t1),
we assume that a candidate wins if she gets more than 50 per cent of the votes. Candidate As
fraction x of overall votes can be modelled as
xA = 0:5 + + f
 
tA1   tB1

+ " (3)
where  is a measure for As advantage over B in case of equal levels of political e¤ort, with
 0:5 <      + < 0:5 where   and + are the minimum and the maximum values of .
The function f
 
tA1   tB1

depicts the e¤ect of political e¤ort on the voting result, with f(0) = 0
and f 0 > 0 > f 00. " is a stochastic shock which cannot be inuenced by the candidates. The
CDF of " is  (") and is assumed to be symmetric and unimodal with  (0) = 0:5. We assume
that the sum of f (:) and " is always small enough to prevent xA to become negative or exceed
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unity. The probability of winning the election is thus given by
A (x  0:5) = 1       f  tA1   tB1  (4)
Thus, the marginal e¤ect of political e¤ort on the reelection probability increases in the density
0 and the marginal e¤ectivity f 0. Since both politicians are identical and A = 1   B, as
well as A0 = B0 due to symmetry, both politicians will always spend the same amount of time
for political e¤ort. That means, in equilibrium f
 
tA1   tB1

= 0. If wi 6= !i and/or W 6= 
i,
this may not be the case. The appendix shows, though, that our results do not depend on the
symmetry assumption although it facilitates notation.
0.5 m+
( ) ( )0.5 1xp m> = - F - 'F
,x e
Winning probability:
0 10.5
Figure 1: Candidate As probability of winning the election.
Figure 1 shows a possible density function 0 ("). The surface beneath the density function for
levels below 0:5 is equivalent to the probability that candidate A loses. In other words, the
larger , the higher the probability that candidate A wins, see equation (4). It is a crucial,
though plausible, assumption that small deviations of " from zero have a higher density than
large deviations. Under this assumption, the slope of the density function is positive, 00 > 0,
for all positive values of .
Comparative static analysis shows that an increase in the politiciansremuneration increases
the time spent for political activities via two channels, dt
A
1
dW
;
dtB1
dW
> 0, as the appendix shows.
Firstly, due to the concavity of the utility function, more income in period 1 weakens the
incumbents incentive to increase outside earnings. Secondly, it makes being reelected more
attractive to both candidates.
Furthermore, increasing the wage rate of outside occupations has an ambiguous e¤ect on both
candidates. As it is shown in the appendix, the incumbent has more incentive to replace
political work by outside occupations since it is better paid, but being reelected gets more
attractive which increases the incentive to spend time for political work. The challenger faces
higher incentives for political work because the political o¢ ce is associated with higher income,
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but, if the incumbent reduces political e¤ort, the challenger may herself reduce her political
worktime. Thus, both e¤ects are ambiguous.4 In the appendix, we show that the same logic
applies for an increase in the out-of-o¢ ce wage rate !.
The focus of our paper is on the link between market conditionsfor politicians and income.
We ask how competitive pressure a¤ects the actual income of politicians. A crucial indicator
of competition may be the (competitive) advantage of one politician over another. The ap-
pendix shows that, using equation (2), the e¤ect of an increase in the exogenously given voting
advantage  on the time spent for outside occupations tA1 can be expressed as
dtA1
d
=
00f 0
 
UA;e   UA;ne
(wA)2 UAC1C1
,
dtB1
d
=
00f 0
 
UB;e   UB;ne
(!B)2 UBC1C1
(5)
00 is the slope of the density function. If we assume that small " (in absolute terms) are
more likely than large deviations from the expected value of the voting result, as in gure 1,
then 00 > 0 for  > 0 and vice versa. This means that an increase in an already existing
(dis)advantage decreases tA1 and t
B
1 . The reason is that it becomes less probable that A loses
(wins) the election. Therefore she can a¤ordspending time on increasing her outside earnings.
If, however, the (dis-)advantage is decreased in absolute terms, i.e. if  approaches zero, political
e¤ort, tA1 and t
B
1 , is increased because its expected pay-o¤ rises.
According to equation (5), the model predicts that a decrease (increase) in political competition
will result in an increase (decrease) in politiciansoutside earnings. Put di¤erently, if the di¤er-
ence to the competitors expected voting result is reduced in absolute terms, both candidates
political e¤ort increases. This distance is interpreted as a measure for political competition.
Competition and, thus, political e¤ort is c.p. at its maximum if both competitors have an
expected voting result of 50%, i.e. if the distance is zero. In the empirical analysis, we will use
this prediction of the model and take past election results as a proxy for the expected voting
result. Our main hypothesis is that a given politician has less outside earnings than her twin
if she is subject to a higher degree of political competition.
3 Empirical approach
The empirical analysis is tailored to test the main implication of the model presented in the pre-
vious section. In particular, we want to estimate how outside earnings of professional politicians
4This trade-o¤ has already been analyzed by Gagliarducci et al. (2007a, 2007b).
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react to varying degrees of electoral competition. As we have previously shown, our model pre-
dicts a negative impact of electoral competition on politicianstime allocated to outside work,
and thus outside earnings. Nevertheless, it is an empirical question whether this relationship
can be substantiated based on real data. We proceed as follows. First, we briey describe
the institutional background, with a focus on the federal electoral system in Germany. We
then discuss our estimation approach, focussing on the potential endogeneity of our measure
of electoral competition and the suggested solution to this problem. Finally, we briey present
and describe the data.
3.1 Institutional background
The federal parliament of Germany, the Bundestag, is the legislative branch of the German
federal political system (together with the Bundesrat, representing the state governments).
The Bundestag is elected every four years. Each citizen has two di¤erent votes, a rst vote
and a second vote. The rst vote is directly attributed to a candidate representing the electoral
district. In each electoral district, the candidate obtaining the majority of rst votes is elected to
the Bundestag by a direct mandate. This part of the election has features of the majority voting
system. With the second vote the elector votes for a party which may then, according to its
share of party votes, send candidates from predened electoral lists into the Bundestag, which
has the feature of proportional representation. These electoral lists contain party candidates
in a predened order. While each directly elected candidate represents one of the 299 electoral
districts, candidates on the party lists can only capture the remaining seats of the Bundestag in
accordance with the overall vote share of their party. The position of candidates on the party
lists is subject to ballot votes taking place on party conventions. There is a minimum threshold
of either 5% of the national party vote or three direct mandates.5
3.2 Estimation approach
We take a straightforward approach to test the empirical implication of the theoretical model.
The population of politicians used to estimate the relation between electoral competition and
outside earnings consists of members of the Bundestag. The dependent variable is the amount
of annual outside earnings reported by individual members of parliament (MP, henceforth). Our
key explanatory variable is the degree of electoral competition, measured by the vote margin
5In case that a party has less than 5% votes but three direct mandates, its number of parliament members
is according to its vote share (proportional representation).
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in the preceding federal election. The vote margin is dened as the di¤erence between the
share of rst votes that a given MP has received in his electoral district and the vote share of
the runner-up. Using a measure for electoral competition based on the outcomes of the last
preceding election means that politicians are assumed to form expectations on the degree of
competition in coming elections based on outcomes of past electoral races.
The main di¢ culty when estimating the impact of electoral competition on outside earnings
is the fact that a MPs ability to earn income from outside work is not only related to the
tradeo¤ between additional income and deteriorating reelection prospects, but will also depend
on personal characteristics a¤ecting the productivity of outside work. We account for this by
including a vector of additional explanatory variables in our estimation equation. In partic-
ular, we extensively control for personal characteristics that might a¤ect the productivity of
MPs in generating outside earnings. However, there is no guarantee that including observable
characteristics on the right-hand side of an estimation equation relating outside earnings to
electoral competition will su¢ ce to provide us with reliable point estimates. The reason for
this is that there might be unobservable characteristics that a¤ect the ability to earn market
income and, at the same time, correlate with electoral success. To give a straightforward ex-
ample, some MPs may simply be smarter than others, making them more successful in terms
of election outcomes and in terms of generating outside earnings. Since the error term in our
estimation equation will account for all unexplained variation in outside earnings, the fact that
smartness is (at least to some extent) unobservable will induce correlation between the residual
and electoral competition as our key explanatory variable. This correlation will render naive
coe¢ cient estimates inconsistent. As described below, we will use instrumental variables (IVs)
to overcome the potential endogeneity problem.
Based on the comparative statics of our theoretical model, we consider the following linear
equation that relates reported outside earnings to the degree of electoral competition and
controls
yi = + ci + Xi + i; (6)
where yi denotes outside earnings, ci is electoral competition, Xi is the vector of control vari-
ables, and i is a residual. To obtain a reasonable measure for ci, we restrict our attention
to those MPs who directly represent an electoral district, i.e. who obtained a majority of rst
votes within their electoral district. This provides us with a sample of 299 MPs who are ho-
mogenous in the sense that their perceptions regarding the probability of reelection in coming
elections can reasonably be assumed to depend on the district-level degree of competition in the
preceding election. As mentioned above, as our measure for the district-level degree of electoral
competition we use the vote margin, dened as the di¤erence between the share of rst votes
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of directly elected MPs and the vote share of the runner-up within the electoral district.6
Regarding the vector of control variables, Xi, we collected data on MPspersonal characteristics
such as age, number of terms served, gender, educational attainment, indicators for family
status, religious orientation, and a broad range of indicators for MPsoccupation before they
started their political career. In addition, we include a full series of state dummies to allow for
common regional shocks that might a¤ect the ability to raise income from outside work and to
account for a potential impact of regional traditions and beliefs regarding the tradeo¤ between
political e¤ort and outside work. Note in particular that the state dummies will fully account
for any di¤erence in outside earnings between East and West Germany. The control variables
and variables of main interest will be discussed in more detail in the following subsection.
As discussed above, we suspect that unobserved factors driving both outside earnings and our
measure of electoral competition induce correlation between the residual, i, and ci. To deal with
this problem, we employ a vector of instrumental variables, Zi, and estimate the coe¢ cients
in equation (6) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). To be valid instruments, variables must
fulll three conditions: they must be strongly (partially) correlated with ci once the exogenous
explanatory variables are netted out; they must be exogenous in the structural equation, i.e.
the elements of Zi must be uncorrelated with i; and they must be validly excluded from the
structural equation.
Our choice of Zi rests on the institutional characteristics of the federal electoral system in
Germany. In particular, we exploit the fact that voters vote on district-level candidates (rst
vote) and parties (second vote) at the same time. Recall that candidates who are directly
elected by obtaining a majority of (district-level) rst votes become members of the Bundestag
irrespective of their partys overall second-vote share. We exploit this institutional feature
and construct a rst instrument, zi1, as the share of second votes MP is party has obtained
within is electoral district in the last preceding election. zi1 lends itself as an instrument for
ci because both the share of rst votes of a given candidate and the share of second votes of
the candidates party will be correlated due to voters casting both of their votes according to
party preferences. Moreover, since the second vote should only reect party preferences, zi1
should not be correlated with the residual. The fact that ci is dened as the rst-vote margin
over the runner-up suggests to dene a second instrument, zi2, as the share of second votes
received by the party represented by the rst-vote runner-up in the next preceding election.
6We also experimented with various measures describing the degree of e¤ective electoral competition for
MPs who are elected through party lists. However, we found it di¢ cult to obtain robust empirical evidence.
This may have to do with the problem that, while we only observe a given MPs position on the relevant list in
past elections, the behavior regarding outside work should depend on politiciansexpectations on their position
in coming election.
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While zi1 should be positively correlated with ci, the correlation between ci and zi2 should
be negative. Using multiple instruments for a single troublesome variable is attractive for two
reasons. Firstly, it typically helps to reduce the standard error of the 2SLS estimates. Secondly,
it allows us to run a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that zi1
and zi2 are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that they are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation.
3.3 Data
In the following, we discuss the the data and present summary statistics. Since our empirical
analysis will be concerned only with the 299 directly elected members of the Bundestag, we
report summary statistics only for this subsample of all MPs. Recall that we exclude MPs
that have been elected through party lists to obtain a sample of politicians with homogenous
perceptions of electoral competition.
Our key variables are outside earnings and electoral competition. The information on outside
earnings is obtained from Bundestag (2007). In 2005, the Bundestag decided to publish an
annual report on outside earnings received by the members of Parliament.7 From 2005 on, each
MP has to report the number and earnings class of his or her outside occupations. However,
due to a lawsuit the data was published as recently as summer 2007 for the years 2005-2007.8
The report on individual outside earnings classies each individual job into one of four dif-
ferent categories: regular occupation, position in a company in the private sector, position in
a company in the public sector and position in a non-prot association. For each category,
we have the number of jobs and for each job the information if it is either one-time or at
regular intervals, and the amount of payments received according to four intervals [0; 1; 000);
[1; 000; 3; 500); [3; 500; 7; 000); [7; 000;1): Assuming an upper bound of 12; 000 Euros for the
highest interval, we calculated the amount of outside earnings for each individual MP by using
average values for each income category (i.e. 500; 2; 250; 5; 250; 9; 500).
Regarding electoral competition, the German electoral system suggests to use the rst-vote
margin. As mentioned above, it is dened as the di¤erence between the vote share that a
given MP has received in his electoral district and the vote share of the runner-up. The data
7Cf. Bundestag (2006).
8The information on outside earnings is available on the website of each MP at
http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/members/mdb/index.html and it is updated in irregular intervals.
We collected this data in fall 2007 and updated the information in the beginning of 2008 to include all outside
earnings from 2005-07.
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refer to the 2005 election and are obtained from Bundeswahlleiter (2005). Table 1 shows
descriptive statistics for our key variables. The average directly elected candidate receives
outside earnings of about 10; 500 Euros per year. The standard deviation of more than 25; 250
Euros indicates that the variation across MPs is quite substantial. The average rst-vote margin
is 13:7 percentage points. Again, there is signicant variation across politicians.
Table 1: Descriptives on key variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Outside earnings 10501 25254 0 144500
Vote margin (rst votes, in %) 13.7 10.5 0.1 48.1
Notes:
Only directly elected candidates included (N = 299).
Regarding our control variables, we have collected information on personal characteristics (edu-
cation, family status etc.) as well as political variables (party a¢ liation, number of terms served,
etc.). Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics. For each variable, we display the number of
MPs, the fraction of MP with strictly positive outside earnings, and the mean income in all
relevant categories.
A few details stand out. Firstly, male MPs have outside earnings that are more than four
times higher than female MPs. Secondly, the income of MPs with a leading position within
the party or the Parliament, i.e. the (vice) chairman of a party or Parliament committee, is
substantially higher compared to the income of common members of the Bundestag. Thirdly,
Christian Democrats have signicantly higher outside earnings than politicians from all other
parties.
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Table 2: Descriptives on personal and political characteristics
Variable Frequency % outside earnings>0 Mean income
Sex
Male 229 0.86 12740
Female 70 0.80 3178
Leading position
0 194 0.82 6073
1 105 0.90 18684
Education
Less than high school 32 0.88 16447
High school 17 0.71 5000
University 196 0.85 9709
Ph.D. 54 0.87 11587
Family status
single 53 0.79 5128
single parent 25 0.80 7370
married 42 0.79 7553
married with children 179 0.88 13222
Sector
Private 117 0.85 11717
Public 107 0.79 6834
Business 5 1.00 8166
Politics 70 0.91 14241
Party
Christian Democrats 149 0.89 13150
Social Democrats 145 0.79 7980
Greens 1 1.00 1000
Socialists 3 1.00 7333
Independent 1 1.00 500
Terms
1 43 0.79 12317
2 95 0.79 7015
3 61 0.92 8639
4 33 0.88 19808
5 67 0.88 11391
Notes:
Only directly elected candidates included (N = 299).
12
4 Empirical results
We start the discussion of our empirical results with a set of OLS regressions reported in
Table 3. The dependent variable is reported outside earnings of directly elected members of
the Bundestag. Specication (1) is a baseline specication with only a subset of our control
variables included. The reported coe¢ cients indicate that an increase in the rst-vote margin
by one percentage point triggers an increase in outside earnings of about 340 Euros. Further-
more, we nd that MPs with leading positions have signicantly higher outside earnings. Our
baseline model also points to female MPs receiving substantially lower income from outside
work compared to their male colleagues.
Table 3: Impact of electoral competition on outside earnings (OLS)
Dependent variable: Outside earnings of directly elected Members of Parliament
(1) (2)
Vote margin 340.2 ?? 516.1 ???
(166.2) (184.4)
Leading position 12,953 ??? 11,699 ???
(3,612) (3746)
Female -8,181 ??? -7,191 ??
(2,127) (2,869)
Age 21.84 803.2
(159.9) (1,901)
High school -7,233 -7,761
(5,998) (6,636)
University -6,050 -1,571
(5,307) (5,465)
Ph.D. -5,741 -3,513
(6,199) (6,986)
R2 0.113 0.242
N 299 299
Additional controls constant see notes below
Notes:
Sample includes only directly elected MPs. Dependent variable is average annual outside earnings reported
for the years 2005-2007, measured in Euro. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) in parentheses.
Additional controls in specication (2): Constant, age squared, number of terms served, dummy variables
for family status (married/no children, married/having children), occupation before started political ca-
reer (public service clerk, company employee, civil servant, freelancer, o¢ cer, manager, attorney, teacher,
politician (general), politician (local level)), political party, and a full series of state dummies.
?? 5% signicance level.
??? 1%.signicance level.
The second column reports a baseline model with a substantial number of additional control
variables (coe¢ cients not reported, see bottom of table for a list of additional controls included).
While the coe¢ cients of leading position and the dummy for female politicians are very similar
to those obtained before, our main coe¢ cient of interest is now substantially larger, suggesting
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that a one percentage-point increase in the vote margin increases outside earnings by 516 Euros
per year.9 If the vote margin increases by one standard deviation, a MP will benet from this
decrease in electoral competition by an increase in outside earnings of about 5,444 Euros per
year. Assuming that this e¤ect is constant over time, over a four-year term this would amount
to 21,800 Euros.
So far we have ignored the main identication problem, i.e. the potential endogeneity of the rst-
vote margin as our measure for electoral competition. Table 4 reports results for instrumental
variables estimations that account for this problem.
Table 4: Impact of electoral competition on outside earnings (2SLS)
Dependent variable: Outside earnings of directly elected Members of Parliament
(1) (2) (3)
Vote margin 455.1 ?? 427.2 ?? 445.2 ???
(184.4) (169.4) (167.9)
Leading position 11,538 ??? 11,500 ??? 11,525 ???
(3,476) (3420) (3,456)
Female -7,363 ??? -7,461 ??? -7,398 ???
(2,583) (2732) (2,628)
R2 0.241 0.242 0.242
N 299 299 299
Additional controls yes yes yes
Hansen test of overident. restr. (p-value) - - 0.831
F -Statistic for joint signicance of IVs 682.94 398.96 681.87
Coe¢ cients of IVs (1st stage):
Second-vote share own party 1.61 - 1.13
(0.06) (0.09)
Second-vote share runner-up party - -1.87 -0.87
(0.09) (0.10)
Notes:
Sample includes only directly elected MPs. Dependent variable is average annual outside earnings reported
for the years 2005-2007, measured in Euro. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity) in parentheses.
Additional controls: Constant, age, age squared, dummies for educational attainment (high school, uni-
versity, Ph.D.), number of terms served, dummy variables for family status (married/no children, mar-
ried/having children), occupation before started political career (public service clerk, company employee,
civil servant, freelancer, o¢ cer, manager, attorney, teacher, politician (general), politician (local level)),
political party, and a full series of state dummies.
?? 5% signicance level.
??? 1%.signicance level.
We show three specications that di¤er in terms of the instruments actually employed in the
rst stage regression. Column (1) depicts the results for a 2SLS estimation where we have
instrumented the rst-vote margin with the share of second votes of a politicians own party,
9Recall that we have calculated outside earnings using the mean income for each of the various income
categories. Using the lower (upper) bound instead changes the coe¢ cients to 353.6 (678.6). In both cases, they
remain signicant at the 1%-level.
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z1. Note that with a single IV, the coe¢ cient of the rst-vote margin is exactly identied,
and we cannot test for instrument validity. Note, however, that the z1 is strongly partially
correlated with our measure for electoral competition, with a coe¢ cient of 1.61 and a standard
error of 0.06 in the rst stage regression. Moreover, the corresponding F -statistic of the rst
stage regression is about 683, suggesting that z1 is a strong instrument for the rst-vote margin.
Turning to our key variable of interest, we note that the coe¢ cient of electoral competition is
only slightly smaller than the corresponding value in the baseline OLS estimation. Calculated
over a four-year term, we still nd that a one-standard deviation increase in the rst-vote
margin triggers a remarkable increase in outside earnings of about 19,200 Euros. Note also
that the point estimate is almost signicant at the 1% level.
Column (2) further substantiates our main result. Keeping the specication of the main regres-
sion constant, the only change compared to column (1) is the use of our second IV, i.e. the share
of second votes received by the party represented by the rst-vote runner-up, z2. A quick in-
spection of the results reveals that relying on z2, we obtain very similar results compared to the
previous estimation. Note that the partial correlation between the IV and the rst-vote margin
is again strong, with a coe¢ cient of -1.87 and a standard error of 0.09. However, the F -statistic
of the rst-stage regression suggests that z1 is the stronger IV compared to z2. While this is in
line with our expectations, the large value of the F -statistic from both 2SLS estimations makes
us condent that the analysis does not su¤er from a weak instruments problem.
As discussed above, it is attractive to use multiple instruments (if available), as the overidenti-
cation of the endogenous explanatory variable allows to test for the validity of the IVs. To do
so, we re-estimated our model using both z1 and z2 as IVs for the politiciansrst-vote margin.
Investigating the outcome reported in Column (3), we rst note that both IVs pass our series
of tests regarding instrument quality. In particular, we nd that both z1 and z2 show a strong
partial correlation with the endogenous variable, with the coe¢ cients in the rst stage regres-
sion carrying the expected sign. Secondly, we note that the F -statistic for joint signicance of
the IVs in the rst stage is 682, conrming again that we do not rely on weak instruments.
Finally, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
at any reasonable level of signicance. Hence, our IVs pass the standard test of instrument
validity without any di¢ culty.
Turning to the coe¢ cient estimates, we nd that the results of the previously reported 2SLS
estimations are conrmed. In particular, our coe¢ cient of main interest is very close to the
levels obtained before. Interestingly, by exploiting the variation from both IVs, we are now
able to reject the null of no e¤ect of electoral competition on politiciansoutside earnings at a
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noticeable 1% level of signicance.
To summarize our empirical results, we nd strong evidence suggesting that MPs benet from
low levels of electoral competition. In particular, and in accordance with our theoretical model,
our data suggest that outside earnings are signicantly higher if electoral competition is low.
Noting the likely endogeneity of our measure of electoral competition, we have employed instru-
mental variables to identify the impact of rst-vote margins on outside earnings of members
of the German Bundestag. As expected, the 2SLS estimation results regarding the e¤ect of
electoral competition on outside earnings are somewhat smaller than compared to a naive es-
timation approach. However, the quantitative di¤erence between OLS and 2SLS estimations is
relatively small.
5 Conclusion
Due to asymmetric information between voters and elected representatives, the quality of poli-
cymaking crucially depends on the incentives of elected politicians to align their actions with
the interests of voters as their principals. Among the various forms of interaction between voters
and elected o¢ cials, elections are certainly the most important incentive-setting mechanism.
However, there is surprisingly little micro-evidence on how politicians react to varying degrees
of electoral competition.
This paper adds to the literature in providing evidence on the link between electoral compet-
ition and politiciansoutside income. Exploiting the remarkable variation in reported outside
earnings in a new data set covering the members of the German Bundestag, we have asked
how outside earnings of MPs who represent electoral districts and are elected by majority rule
react to electoral competition. In accordance with the predictions of a simple theoretical model
focussing on the tradeo¤ between outside work and reelection prospects, our results point to
a signicant negative impact of competition on MPsprivate sector activities. We nd that a
ten-percentage-point decrease in the vote margin decreases annual outside income over a four-
year term by 18,000 to 19,200 Euros on average. To account for the likely endogeneity of our
measure for electoral competition, we have employed instrumental variables that are motivated
by the specic institutional details of the German electoral system.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to provide micro-evidence on the e¤ectiveness
of competitive pressure in driving down politiciansoutside income. However, our ndings t
nicely to evidence reported in related work. In particular, they are complementary to the
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evidence in Gagliarducci et al. (2007b) on a positive relation between electoral competition and
political e¤ort in terms of session attendance. Thus, in the light of evidence presented in related
studies, our ndings point to politicians behaving in a way as it is implied by our theoretical
model: When political competition gets stronger, the tradeo¤ between outside income and
reelection prospects forces politicians to invest more in political activities and, at the same
time, to reduce activities that generate outside earnings.
Though it is tempting to draw the conclusion that an increase in electoral competition would
benet voters, we would like to point to two caveats: Firstly, we have ignored the impact of
electoral competition on the self-selection of citizens into political careers. It may well be the
fact that increased competition reduces the average ability of elected politicians. Secondly, while
our data suggest that politicians devote less time to private sector activities, we do not directly
observe whether politicians increase socially productive or socially unproductive political work
in response (for instance, think of parliamentary work vs. campaigning). Depending on what
type of activity benets most from the reduction in private sector work, the impact on the
welfare of voters may be quite di¤erent. Hence, there remains plenty of scope for future research
on the role of incentives in the political sphere.
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Appendix
This appendix derives the comparative statics results discussed in section 2.
Optimal choices of tA and tB are given by
@E(UA)
@tA1
=  wAUA
CA1
+ 0f 0
 
UA;e   UA;ne = 0
for candidate A and
@E(UB)
@tB1
=  !BUB
CB1
+ 0f 0
 
UB;e   UB;ne = 0 for candidate B, with
0 = 0
    f  tA1   tB1  and f 0 = f 0  tA1   tB1 . Di¤erentiating both equations with respect
to tA, tB and an exogenous parameter y gives:
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and, equivalently,
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It follows from (2) that
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Under symmetry, this implies
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= w2UC1C1 , where we omitted candidate indices according to the
symmetry assumption.
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Now, consider the impact of a small increase in the politicians o¢ cial compensation W . We
therefore need
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Consider now the impact of a small increase in the politicians outside compensation wA. We
therefore need
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from which follows under symmetry
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To determine the impact of a small increase in the wage rate !B, we need @
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For the impact of a small increase in the voting advantage , we need @
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i, the above impact of  reads
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and, equivalently,
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Since the denominator is unambiguously positive10, both equations have the same properties
as in the symmetric case, especially sgn dt
A
1
d
=  sgn00 and sgn dtB1
d
=  sgn00. Note that, under
conditions of asymmetry, 00 is not necessarily equal to zero if  = 0 (since tA 6= tB). This does
not a¤ect our results, though, since our theory relies on the relationship between vote margin
+ f (tA   tB) and not  alone. Thus, all interpretations for the symmetric case apply to the
asymmetric case as well.
10The denominator reads
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which can be shown to be always positive.
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